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Strict Liability and Sick Building
Syndrome: Defining a Building as a
Product Under Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 402A
DAVID REISMAN*
Over the past twenty years, both scientists and the general
public have learned more about environmental risks. As the dangers
to land, rivers and oceans have become painfully obvious, the con-
cern over public health and safety has grown. Efforts to conserve
energy and insulate ourselves against an increasingly polluted world
have created an entirely new type of environmental concern: indoor
air pollution.
One category of indoor air pollution is "sick building syn-
drome" (SBS). SBS has proven dangerous to public health, and
vigorous litigation has developed in this area involving a variety of
creative legal theories. One such theory is that of strict products
liability. The cornerstone of this argument is that a "sick building"
should be defined as a product.
This article will begin with a brief overview of sick building
syndrome. Next, the ramifications of this syndrome are addressed.
Finally, it will place the strict liability argument in the context of
present litigation and define the future development of this area of
the law.
I. SICK BUILDiNG SYNDROME
Sick building syndrome exists when levels of pollution increase
within a building to the point where the building environment be-
comes unhealthy and dangerous to the occupants. The causes of
SBS, and the pollutants which fall within the definition, are numer-
* Associate Attorney, Greenbaum Doll & McDonald, Lexington, Kentucky. BA.
1984, West Virginia Wesleyan College; M.P.A. 1989, University of Kentucky; J.D. 1993,
University of Kentucky College of Law.
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ous and difficult to place within a narrow context. Although SBS
can occur in older buildings as well as modem ones. those office
and residential buildings constructed since the 1970s are more often
affected.'
In the early 1970s, primarily as a result of the energy crisis, the
construction and architectural design of buildings changed in an
effort to increase energy efficiency. Congress encouraged these
changes by providing tax incentives for building owners who re-
duced energy costs. One such change was that of sealing windows,
eliminating the inflow of outside air that had previously resulted in
decreased energy efficiency. Ventilation systems were then installed
which monitored the quality of indoor air by controlling the amount
of outside air that flowed into the building. In modem buildings
designed with standard air conditioning, heating, and ventilation
equipment, air is continuously recirculated throughout the building.
Ventilation systems actually become a major cause of indoor
air pollution when they circulate only limited fresh air or polluted
outside air through the building. When the air contains contaminants
and the pollution levels increase, the ventilation system fails to
remove the contaminated air and replace it with fresh air. Inade-
quate ventilation then exacerbates other causes of indoor air pollu-
tion such as air contamination from outside the building, irritants
from within the building, and contamination from materials used in
construction.!
Scientists feel that airborne microorganisms, allergens, and
particles of synthetic materials, such as fiberglass insulation, are
among the causes of SBS. Other pollutants include: formaldehyde,
asbestos, radon, cigarette and tobacco smoke, viruses, fungi, carbon
monoxide, and chemicals such as phenol, methanol, toluene, and
xylene.3
The contaminants reach the air in a variety of covert ways. For
example, formaldehyde, a toxic and cancer-causing material, may be
contained in carpets, draperies, particle partitions, and pressurized
wood office furniture.4 Formaldehyde fumes are emitted into the air
' Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Rethinking Workplace Safety: An Integration and Eval-
uation of Sick Building Syndrome and Fetal Protection Cases, 8 UCLA J. Envtl. L. &
Pol'y 1, 7-8 (1988).
2 Ruth Gastel, Occupational Disease: Insurance Issues, INs. INFo. INST. REP., June
1994.
Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 8.
Cf Andrew Blum, Structures Face Legal Scrutiny Over Illnesses, NAT'L LAW J.,
Jan. 25, 1988, at 31.
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in a process called "off gassing."' Ammonia fumes can be released
when cleaning solutions are used and ozone is released from the use
of copy machines. Workers themselves contribute to indoor air
contaminants through cigarette smoke. Still other pollutants can be
emitted into the structure when the ventilation system draws in
pollutants, such as carbon dioxide, from the outside. Finally, bacte-
ria and fungi sometimes grow inside the ventilation system and then
spread by being blown through the vents.
6
Another dangerous pollutant is asbestos.' Over the past twenty
years, concern over asbestos has increased greatly as its cancer-
causing effects have become widely known. Primarily used in insu-
lation, asbestos was installed in thousands of schools, office build-
ings, and other structures earlier this century. When the asbestos
becomes old and dried, it becomes brittle and microscopic particles
are released into the air. When inhaled these particles are believed
to cause cancer. The concern over asbestos resulted in billions of
dollars being spent on removal of the material from buildings.
By whatever route, pollutants reach the air inside the enclosed
buildings and if the ventilation system is unable to draw out the
contaminated air and replace it with fresh air, the level of pollutants
rises. Compounding the problem is the possibility that more than
one toxic or allergenic agent could be present, increasing the poten-
tial for two or more pollutants to combine and become even more
dangerous through the reaction.
Depending on what type of pollution is found, the workers and
other occupants may suffer various symptoms including
breathlessness, dry cough, bronchial asthma, tightness in the chest,
rashes and itching, eye irritation, drowsiness, dizziness, and other
more serious effects such as Legionnaire's disease and cancer.'
One of the most infamous instances of SBS occurred in 1976,
when 29 people were killed by Legionnaires' disease.9 This deadly
disease is caused by bacteria transmitted through the air condition-
ing system.' The same disease, and other cases of tuberculosis and
' Terry Morehead Dworkin & Jame P. Mallor, Liability for Formaldehyde-Contami-
nated Housing Materials: Toxic Torts in the Home, 21 AM. BUS. L. J. 307, 309 (1983).
6 Cf. Gastel, supra note 4.
Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 9.
Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 9.
Catherine Cooney, Researcher Challenges EPA on Indoor Air Threat, ENV'T
WK., Nov. 12, 1992.
'o Cooney, supra note 9.
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airborne infections, has killed other workers around the country."
Of the 10 million commercial office buildings in the United
States, it is believed that as many as 20 percent are "sick."'2 This
affects hundreds of thousands of people a year and results in an
estimated 36,000 deaths annually.' 3 According to representatives
from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, and the Department of Energy, SBS has
become one of the principal environmental problems confronting the
United States in the 1990s.
14
II. LEGAL RESPONSE To SBS
While the focus on indoor air pollution continues to increase,
courts already have begun to preside over their first cases involving
SBS. Office workers and owners of buildings are now seeking com-
pensation for their illnesses, lost work time, and economic loss from
problems attributed to buildings which are contaminated. From a
commercial point of view, SBS has significant implications, espe-
cially when considering recovery for denial of access, loss of busi-
ness opportunity, loss of trading income, and diminution in value.
A cause of action in an SBS case generally is brought under
breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, negli-
gence, or strict liability." The primary emphasis of this article will
be devoted to examining a cause of action brought under strict
liability in tort. This theory is predicated on the building being
considered a "product" as defined in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section 402A. 6 First, however, let us briefly turn to the doc-
trine of warranty, including both implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty and implied warranty of habitability, which provides an additional
avenue of recovery.
Id.
2 Robert W. Katz et a), How to Prove a Sick Building Case, TRIAL, Sept. 1991,
at 58. Witnesses who have testified before Congress estimate that hundreds of thousands
of people have probably sustained permanent damage resulting from the breakdown of
their bodies' immune systems because of repeated exposure to harmful chemicals inside
these "sick buildings". Id.
" Katz et al, supra note 14, at 58.
' Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 10.
15 Id.
" See generally C. Jaye Berger, Legal Aspects of Sick Building Syndrome, N.Y.




An implied warranty of merchantability generally means that
goods sold by a merchant will be fit for the ordinary purpose for
which the goods are to be used, unless the goods are properly dis-
claimed. 7 Under this doctrine, a builder's or vendor's duty is to
build or market houses that are reasonably fit for their intended
use. 8 A plaintiff may recover if a residential dwelling contains
dangerous levels of toxic fumes and is deemed unfit for habitation.
As the definition implies, however, this doctrine is more limited
than an action under negligence, since it would only apply to real
property used for residential purposes and not to commercial build-
ings.
9
An additional difficulty that plaintiffs may have to overcome is
the requirement of privity imposed in many states.2" The implied
warranty of habitability was adopted to apply to the sale of new
homes,2' and there presently is a split of authority over whether to
extend the doctrine to subsequent purchasers.'
B. Strict Liability in Tort
Strict products liability has moved away from the traditional
notions of contract and privity and has proven to be an ever-expand-
ing tort. As a legal theory, it has developed with the intention of
holding a defendant strictly liable for a defective product (1) without
proof of negligence; (2) without manifestation of intent to guaran-
tee; (3) without requirement of privity of contract as a prerequisite
to recovery; and (4) without recognizing the validity of contractual
disclaimers of liability.' Although at first glance the idea of strict
liability appears weighted against the defendant, certain public poli-
cy considerations have led courts to accept strict liability in tort as a
more realistic theory of recovery than that of contract-warranty. 4
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1994).
" Dworkin & Mallor, supra not 7, at 323.
M Id. at 324. In addition, action would not be permitted against manufactures of
mobile homes as well because they are considered personal property. Id.
2' Id. at 325.
21 Id.
2 Id.
' W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TOR § 98,
at 692 (5th ed 1984).
", Id. at 693.
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There are three general policy considerations which have influ-
enced courts. The first is that manufacturers who make and sell
products are in the best position to bear the costs of damages due to
defectively dangerous goods." Second, the adoption of strict liabil-
ity with the elimination of the necessity of proving negligence pro-
motes accident prevention.' Finally, strict liability is favored from
a policy standpoint. Because of litigation costs, proof of fault or
negligence in the sale of a defective product should no longer be re-
quired, especially if a product defect is properly defined and limit-
ed.27
The first case to apply strict liability generally was Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2" The Greenman court believed that
a judicial remedy should be provided "to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufac-
turers that put such products on the market rather than by injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves."29 This principle
led to the adoption by the American Law Institute of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts Section 402A in 1964.
Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relations with the seller."
Comment c of section 402A underscores the framers' intent to
address the policy considerations behind adoption of the theory and
states:
I Id. at 692.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 693.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
Id. at 901.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 402A (1977).
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[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the
consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protec-
tion at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it
are those who market the products."
In terms of holding building manufacturers liable under strict
liability, it is important to understand not only section 402A but also
those policy considerations which gave rise to its formation. For
example, in traditional products liability cases one can easily identi-
fy the defective "product," and it is generally obvious that the prod-
uct has entered the stream of commerce. As previously mentioned,
the tort has expanded since its inception and courts have weighed
the prospect of extending strict liability to buildings.32 Courts since
have struggled with the application of traditional policy consider-
ations and different jurisdictions have applied the doctrine with
varying results.
1. Is a Building a Product?
When bringing a cause of action against a building manufactur-
er under strict liability in tort, one of the most perplexing issues is
whether the building or structure is a "product" within the meaning
of section 402A. The question is difficult because a building is not
perceived as a product in the traditional sense. Under a broader
interpretation, however, a structure such as an office building may
be perceived as a product since it is a manufactured whole derived
from smaller parts. When there is a defect in the design, manufac-
ture, or one of the parts, the building can become dangerous like
any other manufactured product.33
A number of courts have held that a building may constitute a
"product" for the purposes of strict liability, but most have done so
in the context of mass-produced structures, such as mobile homes
Id. at cmt. c.
32 Katz et a, supra note 14, at 62.
" In determining whether a building should be considered a product, courts have
had difficulty interpreting comment d of § 402A which states liability " . . . extends to
any product sold in the condition, . . . in which it is expected to reach the ultimate
consumer." RESTATEmENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1977). The comment also
applies the rule to products which, if they are defective, may be expected to and do
cause only "physical harm" in the form of damage to the user's land or chattels. Id.
1994-95)
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and homes constructed as part of housing developments.
In Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co. Inc., the Supreme Court of Arkansas
held that a house was a "product" for the purposes of the Arkansas
strict liability statute." In that case, the second owner of a house
brought an action against the builder-vendor for defects in the house
after it was discovered that formaldehyde fumes were being emitted
from the carpet and padding.35 The court gave lengthy consider-
ation to the issue and reasoned that there was "no meaningful dis-
tinction between the mass production and sale of homes and the
mass production and sale of automobiles."' Citing decisions from
New Jersey and California, the court felt that the pertinent overrid-
ing policy considerations were the same."
In Oliver v. Superior Court,38 the California Court of Appeals
further defined the limit of liability of home developers when it held
that the strict liability doctrine did not apply to occasional construc-
tion and sale of residences. In Oliver, the builder had built only two
homes in two locations.39 The court, finding no authority for ex-
tending the doctrine to the occasional construction and sale of resi-
dences, held that the doctrine applied only to mass-produced homes
because developers of such homes are "in the business" of produc-
ing and selling them."
Jurisdictions which define "products" to include only homes or
structures that are prefabricated and mass-produced eliminate unique
structures, whether or not they are unreasonably dangerous to the
user. The Montana Supreme Court, in Papp v. Rocky Mountain Oil
& Minerals, Inc., upheld a lower court decision that an oil sepa-
rator facility was not a product as would be required for strict tort
liability. In that case, a man working within the facility died of
lethal inhalation of hydrogen sulphide gas that came from allegedly
faulty components where he was working.'2 The appellant alleged
strict liability, negligence, and negligent failure to warn on the
premise that the separator facility and its components were unrea-
' Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co. Inc., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981).
31 Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 324 (quoting Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (1965)).
Id. at 324.
Oliver v. Superior CL, 259 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
I9 d. at 162.
40 Id.




sonably dangerous and defective.43 The court tested the alleged
product against policy considerations, including whether or not the
building was in the stream of commerce, and concluded that, since
there was no issue of disparity in bargaining power or a
manufacturer's use of persuasive advertising or marketing devices to
cause the consumer to buy the product, the worker was not a "con-
sumer" using the treater facility after it had reached the stream of
commerce." The treater facility therefore was not a product. 5
In Washington, the Court of Appeals held that a boathouse was
not a product where a lessee and a guest were overcome by exhaust
fumes as a result of inadequate ventilation.' Although the court
felt the plaintiff's argument inadequate, it reasoned that the
boathouse was not a product since the drafters of the Restatement
did not intend for such buildings to be considered products.47 In a
footnote, the court interpreted comments b and d of Section 402A to
negate any intention on the part of its framers to include buildings
in the definition of a product." This theory is further developed in
Board of Education of Clifton v. W.R. Grace,49 where a board of
education brought suit to recover for the removal of asbestos from a
school building. Citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., the
court reasoned that since comment d lists a number of products
within the purview of Section 402A and does not include buildings,
and because the liability of builders is described and articulated in
other sections of the Restatement, the drafters had not intended
Section 402A to apply to buildings."
Other courts are not so quick to dismiss the consideration of
buildings as products. Although reluctant to place a building within
the purview of Section 402A, some courts have made an attempt to
address the issue as if the buildings could be considered products
should public policy so warrant. Courts thus have attempted to make
a determination of products on a case by case basis guided by pub-
lic policy, the comments of Section 402A, and the Model Uniform
Products Liability Act.
" Id. at 1252.
44 Id. at 1256.
4 id.
" Charlton v. Day Island Marina, Inc., 732 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Wash. Ct App.
1987).
"' Id. at 1011.
4' Id. at 1013.
' Board of Educ. v. Grace, 609 A.2d 92, 93 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
' Id. at 106.
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In Messier v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners,5 a Hawaii court
held that a condominium apartment building was not a product for
purposes of strict liability when a worker was injured after a metal
panel attached to the roof became dislodged and struck him. The
court reached this conclusion only after determining that policy
reasons precluded the finding of a product where the injury occurred
from an identified component of leased or rented premises.52 The
court reasoned that application of the strict products liability rule did
not apply because the plaintiff did not face a great degree of diffi-
culty in proving negligence, and withholding the rule did not mea-
surably diminish the plaintiff's chances of obtaining compensation
for his injuries."
The door nevertheless remains open for an item to be consid-
ered a "product" if it would effectuate the policy for imposing strict
liability in tort. In Chicago Board of Education v. A, C, & S Inc.,"4
the court found that while some buildings as a whole may not be
considered products, a part of a structure may qualify for such a
consideration. Similarly, the New York Supreme Court, in Trustees
of Columbia v. MitchellGiurgola," held strict liability in tort could
be maintained where the wall of a building was an unduly danger-
ous product due to allegedly defective precast panels and facing
tiles.-'
Using these same policy considerations, courts have determined
that a building may constitute a product. The Hawaii Court of Ap-
peals in Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing7 held that prefabricated
buildings were products. The court reasoned that strict liability, as
applied to "assembly type" situations, would reaffirm the policy
considerations underlying the strict products liability rule. First,
maximum protection would be afforded to persons injured by defec-
tive products. Second, the burden of distributing the risk would be
placed on the seller-manufacturer as a cost of doing business. And
5' Messier v. Association of Apartment Owners, 735 P.2d 939, 943 (Haw. CL App.
1987).
52 id. at 947.
I d.
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. A, C, & S, Inc., 525 N.E.2d 950, 960 (11. App. Ct.
1988).
" Trustees of Columbia v. Mitchell/Giurgola Assoc., 109 A.D.2d 449 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985).
' Id. at 455. However, these situations are distinguishable from situations where
improvements are made to part or all of a building. Improvements to a building have
been held to be a service.
s' Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 350 (Haw. 1982).
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third, the seller-manufacturer would have an incentive to guard
against such defects happening in the future.'
While courts have struggled with the concept of defining a
building as a product, it is clear that at least some jurisdictions are
willing to do so if the policy objectives of strict liability are met.
Under the right circumstances, strict liability can be another weapon
in the plaintiff's arsenal in an SBS case. When bringing an action,
plaintiff's counsel should consider the array of claims that may be
brought and make a determination as to whether strict liability may
apply.
2. Difficulty in Proving Causation
In an SBS case it can be difficult to pinpoint when and why an
illness was contracted, and the extent to which the illness is related
to the workplace environment. "Scientific cause-and-effect relation-
ships are generally hard to prove and precise diagnosis of certain
diseases is possible only with an autopsy." '59
Other difficulties in proving causation with occupational diseas-
es arise because of their long latency period. It may take many
years before the harm caused to the human body by such exposures
becomes apparent, making it difficult to determine at what point in
the victim's work history the illness was contracted. It also is diffi-
cult to discover what agent caused the illness and to identify a spe-
cific manufacturer.
In another case, employees working in a new, $53 million
courthouse in Du Page, Illinois began complaining of headaches,
fatigue, dizziness, rashes, itching and burning skin, nasal congestion,
soreness and inflammation of the throat, shortness of breath, and
other breathing problems.' For about a year after the complaints
began, the employees received only skeptical responses from those
looking into the situation.6' Finally, the county hired a team from
the Loyola University Medical Center's Occupational Health Service
to study the problem.' The team randomly selected 108 persons of
the 650 persons who worked in the courthouse. 63 Of the total inter-
Id.
'9 Gastel, supra note 4, at 7.
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viewed, 86 percent reported symptoms associated with being in the
building." The final report concluded that the symptoms com-
plained of were real, not imagined, and that the prevalence of symp-
toms was greatest in parts of the courthouse that were found in
previous studies to have the least adequate ventilation.'
Performing indoor air quality investigations may not work out
as well as in Du Page, however, and investigations may lead to
inconclusive results. The investigation begins by interviewing the
tenants' employees who are ill. The investigation consultant then
assesses the specific health effects and determines any patterns of
frequency, time of day, and location. After interviewing complain-
ants, the investigator conducts a top-to-bottom building review,
including ventilation system design, operation, maintenance, build-
ing procedures, building operations and processes, and building
materials.'
Since SBS cases are fairly new, there is no definitive way to
clearly establish when a building is "sick." In addition, hiring an
investigation team to establish causation can be costly, and the
employer, if not a potential party to a suit, is unlikely to hire the
team. The essential element of causation is likely to play a key role
in future SBS cases.
1H. LITIGATING SICK BUILDING SYNDROME
Sick building syndrome is a broad term that includes a number
of different types of pollution, structures, and health symptoms.
When bringing an SBS action, the first obstacle is to identify the
specific pollutant involved. In an effort to explore the scope of this
arena, it may be helpful to briefly examine some of the recent SBS
actions brought in the United States and apply them to the four
known elements of SBS. It is also of particular interest to note that
most of these cases to date have been settled prior to a higher court
ruling.
One of the first indoor air pollution cases to receive widespread
attention was Buckley v. Kruger Bensen-Ziemer.' Buckley, a com-
puter programmer in California, filed suit against the architect, con-
" Id.
65 Id.
66 Katz et al., supra note 14, at 58-59.
67 See Brun, supra note 6, at 32 and Sick Buildings: A Potenrial Legal Night-
mare?, FIN. TIMES LTD., June 7, 1991.
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tractor, subcontractors, and manufacturers of products and compo-
nents used in the building where he worked, after suffering from
physical ailments that he alleged were a result of the building's
toxic substances. His symptoms, diagnosed as damage to his central
nervous system and brain, had begun at the same time that other
employees experienced lesser ills. The plaintiff claimed damages for
negligence, strict liability, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The suit was settled despite the opinion of the architect's
attorney who believed that the "defense had a 'reasonably good
chance' of proving the plaintiff's problems were drug related and
not from indoor air pollution.'"
Buckley is a good illustration of the difficulty of showing cau-
sation in an SBS case. Obviously important was the fact that
plaintiff's fellow employees were having symptoms at the same time
that he was, but their symptoms were less serious than his. This
circumstance could raise doubt that his illness even came from the
same source as the others.' Even if it did, the plaintiff must show
that the symptoms were a result of the sick building.
Buckley also provides a good example of the symptoms and
conditions which are prevalent in SBS cases. The four key elements
include: (1) the occurrence of respiratory, dermatological, and neu-
rological symptoms (including lethargy) greater than would be ex-
pected in a building with natural ventilation; (2) the symptoms
coincide with the presence of the victim in the building; (3) no non-
occupational circumstances which would explain the symptoms; and
(4) no exposure to toxic chemicals which explain the symptoms.'
As Buckley demonstrates, a link between the building and the illness
can be more easily established when more than a single employee is
suffering from the symptoms." It is also beneficial in establishing
this link if the symptoms or employee complaints are expressed over
a period of time.
Another example of SBS occurred when the Department of
Labor moved into a new office building in 1980.72 For the follow-
ing five years employees complained about poor janitorial services,
extreme temperatures, inadequate ventilation, and carpet and hallway
6 See Blum, supra note 6, at 32.
,' See generally Buckley v. Kruger Bensen-Ziemer, 143393 (Super. Ct, Santa Bar-
bara cty., calif.)
Sjostrom, supra note 65, at Dl.
See Blum, supra note 6.
Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 4 n.19.
1994-95]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
odors." In 1985 the Department of Labor investigated the building
and discovered that the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
systems were contaminated with bacteria.74 It was believed that the
bacteria originated from carpets being dampened by leaking toilets
and urinals on the first and second floors."
Identifying when a building is "sick" is important in an SBS
action, but this does not always establish the proof of causation
necessary to prevail in such a case.
IV. APPLICATION OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
Policy considerations behind Restatement (Second) Section
402A allowed traditional negligence and contract actions in products
liability suits to be brought under a strict liability in tort doctrine if
the elements were met. Although causation still is an element that
must be addressed, application of the doctrine allows the plaintiff to
bring an action without the constraints of proving negligence or
showing privity. It still is necessary, however, for the plaintiff to
show that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous condition
to the user-consumer or his property at the time it was sold.
A distinction also must often be made as to whether the claim
should be brought against the manufacturer of the product which
contaminated the building, or whether that product became a fixture
within the building and the building itself became defective. 76 "Be-
cause the policies which underlie products liability law have little
relation to the policies which underlie fixtures doctrine, the applica-
tion of products liability doctrine should not be dependent upon the
intricacies of real property law." A plaintiff may be able to pro-
ceed on a theory of strict liability in tort despite the fact that the
defective product has become part of the real estate; there is prece-
dent for the application of strict liability in tort to landlords and
builders of residential real estate.7
In Call v. Prudential Insurance Company of America,9 widely
considered the first "pure" SBS case to reach trial, the court ruled as




76 Dworkin & Mallor, supra note 7, at 317.
'n Id.
Id.
Call v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (Calif. Super. Ct settled Oct. 15, 1990).
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should be considered a "product."' The judge ruled that if the jury
were to find the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
system in the building to be defective, each party in the chain of
design and construction would be open to strict, joint and several,
liability for the defective system. Under this approach the building
itself would be a product."
Call was typical of the SBS cases which would follow it. "The
plaintiffs were two firms and their employees who occupied one
half of the floor and shared the HVAC system." 2 In 1985, after
contractors began renovating the interior of an office suite, "employ-
ees experienced dizziness, nausea, nosebleeds, headaches, disorienta-
tion and respiratory problems allegedly due to toxic fumes [emanat-
ing] from the new carpets, furniture and paint on the other side.83
Allegedly, the problem was intensified due to leaks in the ducts of
the HVAC system. 4 Subsequently, the corporations brought suit
for "business interruption losses and lack of productivity." By
ruling that the building was a "product," the court had decided that
the policy considerations underlying the Restatement (Second) Sec-
tion 402A were prevalent in the facts of the particular case." In-
deed, by evaluating the facts of the case, it is possible to see how it
would be difficult, due to institutional reasons and for costs of liti-
gation, for the plaintiffs to prove fault or negligence."'
As in traditional products liability actions, harm was caused to
the employees and the corporation from use of the building. If the
employees and the corporation had brought an action under negli-
gence they would have to show that the builders failed to maintain a
level of standard ordinary care in manufacturing the building. Since
each of the products which comprised the building components and
parts could have been installed properly, and since the HVAC sys-
tem was working, requiring a showing of fault on one or more of
the parties involved could have been an unreasonable burden on the
plaintiffs.
Additionally, in focusing on the economic situation of the
instant case, the court, for policy reasons, evidently felt it best that
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the costs be borne by those who built the building. Application of
strict liability in that instance would send a strong signal to those
who build buildings, causing them to use additional care in design
and construction."
In consideration of the earlier discussion of policy aspects
underlying traditional product liability cases, application of the Call
reasoning allows serious consideration to be given to the idea of
expanding this tort doctrine to include dangerous and defective
structures such as buildings. While Call was settled shortly after the
trial began, the courts obviously have established no clear precedent
in this area. Where a structure falls within the goals of Section
402A, however, one can imagine various buildings being included
in the definition with large numbers of potential plaintiffs who
would find it to their great advantage to bring an action under strict
liability.
Application of the criteria of Section 402A to SBS cases likely
will not fall within the purview of the strict liability doctrine in all
cases because its own requirements lead to certain problems. One
problem is that many toxic tort cases involve only present economic
injury, emotional distress, and the probability of future injury. A
number of jurisdictions, however, refuse to apply strict liability or
implied warranty to remote defendants in the absence of physical
injury or damage to the property. 9 Another problem is that it is
difficult to prove that the contaminated product, whether it be a
product within the building or the building itself, is defective."
While the public's concern and understanding of indoor air pollution
is still relatively new, standards often have not been developed to
measure the degree to which products can emanate certain toxic
fumes; or the quality of air that must be maintained indoors; or the
level at which HVAC systems must recirculate air. Although Con-
gress has already initiated legislation in these areas, there is still
much to be defined. Many of the answers necessary to define what
is defective are unclear.
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CONCLUSION
Although it is still problematic whether courts will accept a
cause of action based on strict liability in SBS cases, recent rulings
have not left it out of the question. Courts will continue to wrestle
with the application of policy considerations to these issues while
research in the area of indoor air pollution will continue to expand
and further connections between illnesses and buildings. While
recovery under alternative theories may be barred due to their own
limitations, courts may press further toward strict liability as a way
to place responsibility on the manufacturers of these buildings.

